Three incidents in the past few months related to Indian quest for nuclear technology adequately serve to bare the wide chasm that separates the myths and reality concerning the country’s nuclear ambitions.  First; revelations by eminent Indian nuclear scientist, K. Santhanam confirming the long held suspicions in the global scientific community that the Indian nuclear test of a thermo nuclear device on May 11, 1998 was unsuccessful. The device, expected to provide a yield of 45 KT, “underperformed” says the former Defense Research and Development Organization top nuclear scientist who was the field director during the Pokharan II nuclear tests.

Second, the launching of INS Arihant , India’s ‘first’ nuclear submarine , on 26 July 2009 with much fanfare and hailed as a harbinger of India’s entry in the exclusive  club of superpowers holding such vehicles of strategic power projection with a global reach. The blessing ceremonies performed by smashing a coconut on submarine’s steel hull from the Vishakapatnam dry dock, apparently turned out to be a farce. Reason; the hulk lowered into water was something indescribable or how would one categorize a nuclear submarine without a nuclear reactor or strategic long range weapon systems that go with such assets. According to a report in the Defense Professional Daily, an online German publication, “Arihant, without nuclear propulsion or weapon systems, is presently little more than a floating hull”. Indian sources claim that the submarine is fitted with an 80 – MW nuclear power plant secretly developed at Kalpakkam and revealed to media on Aug 2, but how this capability demonstrator could be termed as an operational nuclear reactor propelling Arihant, is something that only Indian spin doctors can explain. India’s nuclear submarine program has been going on under wraps for over two decades and there has been some progress in developing the design for the nuclear reactor, capable of operating on 20% enriched uranium but to say that Indians have a functional nuclear submarine reactor in hand is being wishful.

Third, the bizarre incident of nuclear sabotage at Kaiga Atomic Plant has sent tremors across the nuclear establishment around the world at the lax security arrangements maintained in the Indian nuclear plants. The brazen act of sabotage has demonstrated the casualness and non professional attitude of the Indian nuclear establishment that has raised the specter of an Indian Chernobyl; a nuclear disaster that is waiting to happen behind the wall of secrecy so assiduously maintained by the Indian nuclear scientist community. Forty five staffers fell sick on the night of 24 November 2009 after they drank water from a sealed water cooler at the Kaiga Nuclear Plant in Maharashtra State. Some rogue scientist had ‘injected’ tritiated heavy water into the water cooler to probably say farewell to the outgoing chief of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Anil Kakodkar, laying bare the intrigues and conspiracies that have become endemic to the cutthroat culture of rivalry among various factions of the top deck of scientific community, jockeying for influence in an India set for considerable expansion in the near future.

Three conclusions emerge from the string of above mentioned incidents. First is the Indian obsession with projecting an aura of a country poised at the threshold of greatness; all set to stake a claim to regional leadership. If Indian sights are set at securing a much sought membership of the UN Security council then a respectable pile of hydrogen bombs and a nuclear submarine as their delivery means are essential accoutrements – even as millions struggle for existence beneath the poverty line. There are no holds barred to accomplish such an image and no effort is spared to achieve the end result; even at the cost covering up stark failures and acts of sabotage. According to Santhanam , even Dr.Kalam , the then DRDO chief was aware that the thermonuclear test had failed but the future President of India chose to remain silent – bowing to the political compulsions, and allowing the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpaee to proclaim to the world that the Pokharan II was a “spectacular success”.  Announcement of India’s entry into the nuclear submarine club with a half baked product without a nuclear reactor is certainly premature and is reflective of a desire to project an aura without acquiring the requisite capability.

Second; the lax security conditions prevailing at the India nuclear plants are an invitation to disaster and sabotage. The water in the cooler at Kaiga Atomic Plant was spiked with tritiated heavy water which is used as a coolant in the nuclear reactor. It was an insider job; a disgruntled scientist or a wayward ideologue getting even with the system. Such rogue elements now have a confirmed presence in the Indian nuclear establishment and it is not a question of if but when and where would they strike again. The standard of physical safety also leaves much to be desired. There were no security cameras covering the interior premises of the Kaiga Nuclear Plant that happens to be rather a newer establishment. At older plants the conditions are certainly more chaotic. The incidents ought to set the alarms bell ringing for the mentors of Indian nuclear program who want the country to speedily emerge as a nuclear colossus.

Third; as is evident from record, the safety status in India’s nuclear facilities is far below international standards. Recurring incidents of accidents and nuclear sabotage have exposed inefficiency at India’s archaic nuclear regulatory mechanism, casting doubts upon their capability to avert incidents of proliferation and nuclear disasters. Top Indian scientists are obsessed with a smooth ride to the top of bureaucratic ladder rather than committing themselves to pursuits of science and technology and matters of safety. Situation gets further exacerbated by the Indian propensity to deny responsibility for the incidents of nuclear sabotage by attributing these to the ever present “foreign hand”. In such an environment the emphasis is to cover up accidents behind the readily available subterfuge of secrecy. India’s ineffective nuclear supervisory system coupled with an indigenous cult of terrorism, rather than a ‘foreign hand’, remains at the heart of the nuclear security problems confronting India.

MTT - India - Shaft mouth for one of the Shakti tests. The camouflage netting is an interesting feature. If this was one of the three shaft dug in the early 80s, and not used until the Shakti I-III shots on 11 May 1998, then camoflaging it might be a possible give-away since it presumably would have been un- camoflaged for almost two decades.