India claimed to have conducted a 45kt thermonuclear (fusion) test, a 15kt fission test and a 0.2kt experimental test on May 11, 1998, besides a 0.5kt test and a 0.3kt test on May. After the tests, India claimed that “the yields, estimated through close-in measurements, are consistent with design yields and have been confirmed by analysis of global and regional seismic data, by post-shot gamma radiation logging measurement and by radiochemical measurements on rock samples.”  However, majority of the foreign seismic experts remained skeptical of Indian claims.  They believed the yields to be overstated.

The foreign experts noted that the Indians used the yield-measuring formula relevant to Eurasian plate (Russian Shagan River site), instead of the Nevada test site (with a = 4.05 rather than 4.45 and b =0.77).

Nucleonics Week (November 1998) also challenged Indian claims.  It reported that “the second stage” of India’s two-stage hydrogen bomb device “failed to ignite as planned”. The primary stage did detonate, but its heat failed to ignite the secondary stage.

Recently, Indian scientist, Santhanam, an associate of the Pokhran-II tests, also called into question the success of the tests.   The pro-success scientists called the whistle-blower, though a tardy one,  a maverick.

Santhanam alleged that the thermonuclear test, designed for a yield of 45kt was a fizzle and its yield may not have been more than 20kt. But, Chidambaram (Pokhran-II in charge) claimed that he could build bombs up to 200kt with it.

The revived debate has engendered several questions: Should India conduct more tests to confirm the yields or sign the CTBT?  Should it accumulate thermonuclear devices without further tests?

Barak Obama is pressing Senate to ratify the CTBT.  The pro-further-tests lobby within India is building pressure against signing the CTBT. The army camp insists that armed forces have become unsure of the country’s nuclear deterrence capability. Even if India is coerced into signing the CTBT, it should first carry out a couple of tests.

If India tests further, Pakistan shall have to follow suite. There shall be a tremendous strain on the meagre financial resources of the two countries.  The initial cost of the nuclear race would rise manifold over time if the nuke-sub case is any lesson.   The sub was estimated to cost under Rs.1, 000 crore when the Advanced Technology Vessel project was started in 1975. Thirty four years later the cost has escalated to Rs.30, 000 crore. The nuke sub, if anything would just be a status symbol.  It will be fabricated with Russian precision equipment, and reactor-miniaturising.

The USA should tell India point-blank that the Indo-US civil nuclear deal will go for a toss, if India tests again. The Hyde Act of the US provides for scrapping the deal and demanding return of fuel and equipment exported to India.

The author is freelance journalist based in Islamabad.